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Europe, an ongoing debate
Europe continues to occupy our minds. To give some examples: in 2004 the cultural think 
tank Nexus organised a series of conferences in the Hague, Warsaw, Berlin and even 
Washington D.C. where intellectuals, researchers, politicians and jurists discussed the 
question of the European identity and of the route ahead Europe should take. Still, more 
well-known is the series of conferences for the end of framing the European constitution. 
Understandably this process and subsequently the plebiscite on the constitution in various 
countries were accompanied by a flood of publications. The same was (and is) the case 
with the topic of the expansion of the European Union. And those debates are, obviously 
because of the importance of the matter, not at all an inner-European concern only. Ame-
ricans, Russians and a lot of others contributed to these discussions1 as well. So in point 
of fact, Europe is keeping the minds of many persons busy.
The embarrassing thing with that is that the contributions operate at very different 
levels and from very different perspectives. For some, like the former Dutch member of 
the European Commission Bolkestein, Europe is primarily, and in fact solely, an econom-
ic project. In this view the main role of the Union is the completion of the internal market. 
1 See, e.g., the article “The door does not need to be opened to Turkey and the Ukraine” by Russian political 
scientist and economist Vladislav Inozemtsev in the Dutch newspaper Trouw (02–05–2006).
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However, the economy is never only economy. It always functions within wider juridical, 
political, social and cultural contexts, that is within whole a set of non-economic precon-
ditions, such as trust, sense of duty, integrity of rulers, managers and public servants, 
political and social stability, a certain work ethics, a well-functioning legal system, a good 
educational system and several other factors. And not in the last place, the economy func-
tions within a context of shared convictions, values and fundamental attitudes which are 
characteristic of a particular society. So whoever pursues an economic policy necessarily 
pursues a juridical, educational, social etc. policy, all of this against the background of 
more general cultural and ideal matters of fact (which for their part, if only indirectly, also 
are affected in that way).
In that manner Europe has meanwhile developed a whole corpus of European public 
and civil law with the corresponding institutions and organs. Likewise on the European 
level policies are pursued with respect to education, police cooperation, environment, etc. 
In short, whoever pursues economic policies is always doing more, viz. is implementing 
a specific (maybe largely implicit) view of society and of the human identity. And the more 
the processes on the European level are moving forward, having passed the stage of limited 
practical arrangements, the more that view of society and identity (who we are, and espe-
cially who we want to be, in this part of the world) becomes ever more important.
So the question is: what is Europe, what is the matter the name refers to? Probably, 
Europe has never been the name solely of a continent in a purely geographic sense. Put 
otherwise, social and historical connotations were implied in the notion from the start. 
That becomes visible already from the fact that Europe, as it does not have clear natural 
borders at the Eastern side at any rate, is no clearly demarcated entity from a geographic 
viewpoint. So, historical and religious-cultural factors were involved in its delineation 
as long as Europe has existed. Although in this way Europe was always more than 
a geographic concept, this surely is the case today, now that all kinds of integration 
processes (in the monetary, agricultural, legal field, etc.) are at work. Since all sorts of 
phenomena have gone sailing under European colours (European law, the European 
Court of Human Rights, Europol, Euratom, etc.2), Europe consequently has become 
ever more important to life on the continent3. And so the question of the European iden-
tity gains an ever increasing urgency. It is from that perspective that attempts should 
be seen to frame a European constitution, a document, that is to say, intending to give 
a profile and blueprint of the social-political entity Europe.
For a long time hardly any attention was paid to that question. And the urgency 
for that was not felt seriously. I already touched upon that above, because mostly, 
e.g. with regard to monetary or agricultural policies, very practical questions were at 
stake, which moreover concerned only a specific sector of society and therefore hardly 
brought into vision Europe as a more encompassing unit. And still it cannot be denied 
2  One could mention further, among other things: the European Central Bank, the European Parliament, the 
European Social Charter (1961), all kinds of European policies (agricultural etc.), the European Environmen-
tal Agency, Eurotransplant, but also European Cup football, the Eurovision Song Contest, etc.
3  For instance: European law takes precedence over national law, at any rate in the Netherlands, but not (auto-
matically) in Germany.
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that the factors spurring the European unification process are to a considerable extent 
of a practical-pragmatic kind, such as the necessity of a common security and environ-
mental policy, but first of all the pressure to be able, in a globalising economy, to carry 
on the race, especially with America and Japan, but also with rising powers such as 
China, India, Brazil and others.
The importance of the cultural factor
But it is questionable whether that is the whole story. Could it be so – a question I will try 
to answer (rather roughly) affirmatively in the following – that all these practical processes 
and initiatives suppose a frame of orientation that ultimately directs them and make them 
possible? That, in other words, I already alluded to that above, all these processes rest on 
a “cultural” basis, or have a cultural dimension which, however, often (or should one say: 
usually?) is ignored. This claim is connected with two other ones.
Firstly, that a community is more than the sum total of its parts, that is that it consti-
tutes a communal unit that transcends its components; and secondly, that goal-oriented 
action presupposes, however implicitly, a more or less intact frame of orientation. I 
explain this in a little more detail. With regard to the first claim: as one of the cha-
racteristics of modern society the differentiation of society is often mentioned, i.e. the 
gaining of relative autonomy of sectors like economy, law, science, art etc. They are, in 
other words, considered to answer to their own specific norms and to function accor-
ding to their own laws only. In that manner science and politics emancipate themselves 
from religion, economy sets itself free from morality and politics, law is considered as 
an independent closed domain with its own idiom, logic and procedures, and in art only 
aesthetic criteria are deemed valid, and so on.
The German sociologist Niklas Luhmann can be considered as one of the most 
marked representatives of this differentiation thesis  (see, e.g., Luhmann 1990). He de-
scribes the modernization process as the development from a stratificatory to a func-
tionally differentiated society. In this view “society” is nothing but an umbrella term of 
self-referential functional systems of which each possesses an operational autonomy as 
they function according to their own binary code (science of true and false, the law of 
just and unjust, etc.). They only observe one another from their own frame of reference, 
influence the functioning of one another only in a derivative sense, and react mainly to 
internal disturbances and not directly to the environment of the system. For Luhmann 
in this way all social subsystems are quasi-autonomous. Something like an underlying 
unity of the subsystems, or a life world that encompasses separate sectors of society, is 
totally out of question.
Undoubtedly differentiation is an important characteristic of modernity. And it is 
the source of important achievements, as well (for that matter) of weighty problems, 
of the modern age. But views such as Luhmann’s seem to me to offer a strong misre-
presentation of the modern situation because they overrate the self-sufficiency of the 
“subsystems” and in that way reduce society to the sum total of its constituents. It may 
be that certain sectors of society like science, technology and economy are able to 
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a higher degree, than other ones, to determine the conditions of their functioning and 
that they do convey the impression that their development mainly displays dynamics of 
their own. But surely that does not apply to all sectors of society and probably to none 
in the full sense.
To give some examples: no doubt the law has a “technicity” of its own, i.e. a specific 
idiom, logic and procedures, which are often still hardly accessible for a layman and 
therefore require a special expertise. In contrast with that in olden times in Israel the 
firstborn passed sentence guided by a sense of justice that was rooted in the community’s 
tradition and sharpened by experience of life. And in Athens it belonged to the civic 
prerogatives to be allowed to participate in the administration of justice. But although 
modern law has become “technical” and a matter of experts, that is not and cannot be the 
whole story. If the law is not to a sufficient degree in keeping with the citizens’ sense of 
justice, it loses its legitimacy and, together with that, its binding power. The development 
of the law remains to a high degree under the influence of everyday convictions living in 
the community. From its very nature the law can only to a certain extent define its points 
of departure and basic assumptions. To that extent the dynamics of the law is not so much 
a matter of the law itself, but is determined by external factors. The law, in short, is to an 
important degree the expression of the symbolic universe of the community in general, 
of the prevailing view of man and society, such as, that in principle people are of equal 
standing in front of the law (so class justice is out of the question) or, on the contrary, are 
of unequal standing as in feudal societies; that men and women are equal or just have 
different social roles, duties and rights; that people cannot be the object of property and 
cannot be sold etc., as is the case in societies practising slavery; that torture and cruel 
corporal punishment are permitted or not, etc.
An analogous story applies for the economy, to return for a moment to a subject I 
already touched upon earlier, although it is considered rather generally as an independent 
sector of society – in my view a typically modern-western idiosyncracy, and a disas-
trous one at that. It is for that matter already a curious thing that the independence of the 
economy rests on political decisions of liberalizing and deregulating it. We set, in other 
words, the economy free because of the modern belief that it constitutes the key to human 
well-being. But beside that, particularly in the field of development aid, it dawned on us 
that the economy always functions within broader political, social and cultural contexts. 
Development of “less developed” societies turned out, otherwise than people thought 
around 1960, not to be solely a matter of injecting capital and technology (of course, that 
is implied as well), but first of all to be a comprehensive political, social and cultural 
process. Just because, as I said above, the economy always functions within a broader 
framework of society as a whole, or, put otherwise, functions by the grace of the availa-
bility of a whole range of conditions of a non-economic kind, such as political stability, 
trust of the population in the social process etc.
But if the functioning of the economy depends upon a whole series of factors of a po-
litical, social and cultural kind, then there exist at least as many forms of economy as 
there are different political, social and cultural systems or life-styles. In other words, 
there cannot be one general economic model, unless it is imposed from the outside and, 
then, almost inevitably leads to derailment. What now generally passes for economy is 
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thus the economic expression of the western type of society with its scanty and superficial 
social relations, its stress because of high workload and sharp competitiveness, and its 
definition of well-being in terms of material welfare and its chronic neglect of the imma-
terial dimensions of well-being.
Similar stories could be told with regard to literature, art, sports, and even science 
and technology. The thesis is, in short, that each society gets the economy, legal system, 
literature, art, science etc. it “deserves”, i.e. which are the expression of the outlook and 
mentality that prevail in that society. Applied to Europe, it means that here as well such 
a common outlook and mentality has to be presumed in the background of the practical 
processes. They should then be made explicit, because it is to be expected that, especially 
where more fundamental decisions are concerned, they will come into play. Long drawn-
out conflicts could then turn out to be caused beside by clashes of interest, by differences 
of interpretation of those background convictions or by a lack of such a basic consensus. 
In that case something like a European community would consequently be a fiction.
A background of shared values
With regard to the second claim stated above, that practical processes rest upon a “cultural” 
foundation, yet another consideration points in the same direction. Where practical questions 
are concerned, as in the case of monetary, agricultural, environmental or security policies, 
what actually (at any rate mostly) is at stake is a matter of problem solving, i.e. finding ad-
equate answers to practical problems. Put otherwise: what is at stake is goal-rational action, 
to use Max Weber’s expression. Insofar politics confines itself to that, i.e. takes goals more 
or less for granted and now looks for the most appropriate strategies and means to achieve 
them, it constitutes (or, in this case, degenerates into) a form of social technology.
But goals presuppose, however implicitly, convictions about what is of value. Now, 
with regard to values three statements can be made: (a) They have to be made explicit 
to gain clarity about what one wants more precisely; and not in the last place to have an 
insight into where different values clash, what one therefore cannot want at the same 
time, and how and with what implications values can be accommodated; (b) To be really 
able to motivate people, values have to be articulated and made experientially recognis-
able, and their embodiment in attitudes, practices, institutions and life-styles has to be 
made clear; (c) Values do not float around separately in the world, but they are bound up 
with views about reality, man and society. In that sense values have an ontological (and 
epistemological) dimension which has to be made visible in the process of making them 
explicit. For instance, the modern idea of freedom is connected with an individualism 
(often conceived in an atomic fashion) in the contemplation of man. Also it implies an 
emancipation of a man from nature, and correlates in connection with that with an objec-
tivistic and “disenchanted” image of nature (see Thomas Hobbes, Immanuel Kant and 
Jean Paul Sartre, among others).
In short, values are situated in the context of a more encompassing frame of reference, 
in which, as has been said, the ontological, axiological and epistemological dimensions 
are interwoven with each other and mutually refer to each other.
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Once again applied to Europe this means that goal-rational action on the European 
level presupposes a framework of orientation guiding that action – or in case of absence 
frustrating it, at least in the long run. Put otherwise: the European associations directed 
to a specific purpose require, to be able to function enduringly, an underlying community 
and culture, or a European ”story” and outlook that is lived in practice. Regularly, in this 
connection the term “community of values” is used. Then, evidently, what has just been 
said about values applies, viz. that they always are situated within broader frames of 
reference. And the question is, of course: does that story or that community (of outlook, 
values and life) exist, and if so, to what extent and in what fashion?
There is a lot of scepsis with regard to this, and not altogether without grounds. In 
Europe, so the argument runs, the disparity in thinking, ways of life and mentality is too 
great to allow it to be considered as a community of life, whereas furthermore the inha-
bitants of the continent hardly possess a feeling of solidarity towards one another – the 
well-known no-demos argument. Behind this phrasing lie hidden, as is clear, the features 
characterising a nation, i.e. a group of people united by objective and subjective factors: 
as to the former (objective) features by a common territory, a common history, language, 
culture, way of life and the like, and as to the latter (subjective) ones by a feeling of one-
ness and solidarity. Tested by these criteria, thus (this line of argument continues), Europe 
is no demos, no community that can form the basis of European political unity other than 
a federation of sovereign states.
Now, it is possible to raise the question whether there has to be a demos before, and 
on the basis of which, a political unity can come into being. Most existent political com-
munities were put together “top-down” by means of conquest, inheritance, marriage 
and suchlike, and after that became a nation little by little (Great Britain, Germany, 
France, Spain, the Netherlands and so on; and still the traces of these previously in-
dependent components have not disappeared totally; think, for instance, of Scotland, 
“Freistaat Bayern”, Catalonia, among many other examples). But such a process of 
nation-building that would be started top-down is out of question in modern Europe, 
determined as it is by the idea of democracy and popular sovereignty.
According to some authors, among others Habermas, a demos is not needed at all. In 
a debate with Dieter Grimm, Habermas states (Habermas 1995) that democracy does not 
rest upon an underlying national or ethnic unity. On the contrary, he says, it is the result of 
an abstract solidarity between strangers that is framed by laws. In the case of Europe that 
solidarity, then, has to be a cross-border one. That seems to me, however, to be a much too 
narrow notion of democracy, and one that will not work at that. Such a solidarity that is 
based on abstract principles only, simply will not take root because it has no experiential 
value and motivating power. Let me deal with the matter in a little more detail.
The idea of democracy
Surely, democracy not infrequently is conceived of, as to its nature, as a system of political 
decision-making, as a matter, that is, of procedures and institutional arrangements, in the 
first place majority rule. If that is the whole story, democracy is, therefore, a purely formal 
matter, viz. an aggregate of rules of play by means of which the political decision-making 
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process is regulated as to its form, without any implication with respect to its content. This 
conception of democracy is, however, to my mind insufficient to render a satisfactory ac-
count of at least the western views and intuitions regarding democracy4. Mostly we asso-
ciate a number of things with the idea of democracy which are not in the least purely formal 
and normatively neutral, but which denote an ideal of living together and in that sense pos-
sess a clearly normative connotation, such as freedom, equality of all in their quality as 
human beings, implying for instance equality of all before the law, tolerance and respect 
with regard to one another’s convictions and ways of life, protection of minorities and safe-
guarding of human rights.
As a consequence, democracy is not at all a matter solely of abstract principles and 
institutional arrangements. It is the expression on the political level of a free, open 
and “anti-authoritarian” form of life more in general that is also practised in companies, 
schools, families, all kinds of associations, etc. In short, beside a formal institutional frame-
work of political decision-making, democracy is first of all the idea of a social-political order 
with an accompanying image of man and fundamental attitudes5. As a political institution it 
is based on a supra-political idea or “story” that is typical of all relationships.
Basic idea and components of the European “story”
The core of that idea or story is respect for the human person as a being with insight, 
experience, conscience and will of its own, a being who because of those qualities 
has to be taken seriously and given the opportunity to determine his own identity and 
way of life. Attitudes which fit in with this basic idea are self-criticism and, as already 
mentioned, tolerance and respect (within certain limits) regarding other ways of giving 
shape to one’s own identity. Where this image of man and these basic attitudes have 
developed not at all or only weakly, where the institution of democracy is not backed 
by a story like this and an accompanying network of practices and attitudes, there, as 
history shows, it soon withers away or gets perverted by alien patterns of behaviour like 
abuse of power, intimidation and corruption.
If, that is the implication of the above, Europe is to be more than a series of practi-
cal arrangements and associations directed to specific objectives – in the long run that 
would be a dead end – then there has to be a story that is characteristic of the European 
identity, or an organizing idea or cluster of ideas, naturally together with the accompa-
nying attitudes and practices. In short, there has to be a European culture and mentality. 
And the question is: does it exist? I think it does, becoming particularly visible in the 
contrast with non-western (African, Asian etc.) cultures, and within the western cultu-
ral area also with the American society and mentality. 
To underpin that statement I list a series of components of the (modern) European 
story: besides the already mentioned democracy, understood in its broad “cultural”sense, 
4 That is the subject I am talking about in this connection. For other conceptions of democracy, see e.g. 
Macpherson 1965.
5 Cf. Sartori 1968: 112: “The term democracy indicates both a set of ideals and a political system <…>”, to which he 
adds a bit further that the idea of democracy  “is a by-product of the entire development of Western civilisation”.
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the constitutional state with its rule of law, the idea of human rights, a humane criminal law 
with its guarantees of a fair trial, the equality of all citizens (in the sense of being entitled to 
an equal respect irrespective of race, religion or philosophy of life, gender or sexual in-
clination), “bottom up” legitimation in politics, organizations etc. which furthermore is not 
automatically connected with specific positions in society, but has to be “deserved” by the 
persons holding those positions by means of an authority creating behaviour. Underlying 
all these things ultimately is the same organizing idea (or complex of ideas), viz. respect for 
the person as a being in its own right, i.e. the person herself is the instance to give shape to 
her own life and identity. From this point of view she has to be offered full scope to develop 
her personality according to her own convictions, naturally under the condition that it does 
not compromise the opportunity of her fellow-men to do the same. To formulate the mat-
ter ot herwise: those profound convictions, often designated as “convictions of conscience”, 
which are of overriding importance to the person in question and shape her identity, call 
upon society and the fellow citizens to respect them (and the lines of conduct immediately 
connected with them6) – not because of the content of those convictions which may be pret-
ty bizarre, but out of respect for the person holding them. Analogously, in the case of the 
freedom of religion not the content of whatever religion is at stake, but the person expressing 
him/herself in it, who in that way asks for respect for a fundamental expression of her iden-
tity. That is: with the freedom of religion it is not so much religion or a particular religion as 
such that is the subject of protection, but the religious person or group of persons.
All things mentioned above (democracy, the constitutional state, respect for other peo-
ple’s deep-seated convictions, etc.) revolve around the same normative idea of humanity, 
in the inter-human relationships in general, but particularly in politics. Put differently, in 
all kinds of contexts a basic idea expresses itself anew, viz. that people are primarily the 
subject of their own lives and are the ones to give them a personal interpretation. Or, as 
a well-known phrasing runs: that people are always treated also as an end in themselves 
and never simply as a pure means or object without a will of their own. Implications, 
among others, are: anti-paternalism, minimizing asymmetrical power relations and re-
placing them by legal and symmetrical communicative relationships.
Not in the last place the purport of the above-mentioned basic idea can be made visible 
from the contrast. It excludes practices such as slavery, human trafficking, degrading and 
unworthy treatment e.g. of prisoners, detention without charge, torture, cruel punishment, 
kidnapping, taking of hostages – in short, all kinds of actions by which people are treated 
purely as objects; and further things like dictatorship, oligarchy, intimidation, blood feud, 
“honour killings”, i.e. the practice of avenging someone’s (e.g. your sister’s) honour, etc.
It is, to give still one further example, not difficult to see that human rights rest upon 
the afore-mentioned organizing idea, therefore play such a prominent role in European 
thinking, and that the separate human rights form the materialization more in detail of 
that idea. Human rights can be understood as public guarantees for the development of 
citizens as persons. Whatever human rights may be beside that – the question then is, for 
instance, whether they have a so-called “horizontal working”, i.e. whether they also have 
6 Such as conscientious objection to military service, to vaccination, etc.
156 Koo van der Wal. europe, Idea of a Continent: the Quest for the european Identity
currency in the relations among citizens and among private bodies like corporations – hu-
man rights are primarily the principles of political ethics, prompted by a supra-political 
idea. Once again: it is the tenor of human rights to create conditions on the political level 
of society for the development of being human as a person and subject.
Distinctive features vis-à-vis America
I said above that the European “story”, the existence of which, I hope, may have become 
plausible in the foregoing, makes visible the specific character of a European identity not 
only vis-à-vis non-western cultural spheres, but inside western culture also vis-à-vis Ame-
rica. This could be elucidated in the following way: The motto of the French Revolution 
“Liberty, equality and fraternity” can be considered as one of the condensed wordings 
of the European basic idea. It maintains, by the way, a narrow relationship to the idea of 
human rights. Not by chance was the first action of the French National Assembly in 1789 
the drafting of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizens, which was meant 
as the ideal foundation upon which the new social and political order was to be raised. In 
other words, the idea of human rights and the motto of the French Revolution mutually 
refer to one another.
Now, the American bills of rights, as the Virginia Bill and the Declaration of Indepen-
dence of 1776, overlap to a considerable extent with the French Declaration and the motto of 
the Revolution, except in one respect: the neglect of the theme of fraternity7. Consequently, 
in the view of the framers of the Constitution, the French society is not based only on liberty 
and equality, or, as one could say, on equal liberty – there ends the matter in America – but 
beside that on solidarity. Not coincidentally in Europe the constitutional state developed 
into the social constitutional state or welfare state (“sozialer Rechtsstaat”, as the Germans 
call it). By European standards the freedom of the citizens cannot be guaranteed sufficiently 
solely by the means of negative rights (rights of non-interference), but it requires also the 
creation of positive guarantees in the form of facilities in the fields of education, health care, 
provisions for old age, unemployment compensations, etc. Therefore, although possibly the 
welfare state has to be restructured because it has gone awry, yet I think that the connection 
of equal liberty and solidarity, as it was first given expression in the motto of the French 
Revolution, is a fundamental characteristic of Europe and cannot be abandoned. A chilly 
and hard society à la America, in short, is un-European.
To illustrate this disparity with regard to the social climate and mentality, one could 
point to the difference between the American and the European (“Rhineland”) business 
model. The former is highly competitive and result-oriented, and first of all pays attention 
to the organisation structure (over against the organisation culture) of the companies. What 
is at stake in this respect, as is well-known, are matters as the organisation as an impersonal 
7 American, or more broadly “Anglo-Saxon”, social and political philosophers sometimes are aware of this. See 
e.g., Rawls 1971: 105, where he remarks that “in comparison with liberty and equality, the idea of fraternity 
has had a lesser place in democratic theory”. And in the Afterword of his book Lukes 1973: 158, Steven Lukes 
writes that the analysis or “map” he has given of the concept of individualism “focuses on liberty and equality, 
but ignores the crucial third term of fraternity, or community”. 
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network of functions, formal lines of decision authority, “human resource management”, 
“targets”, “output” and suchlike. With this go standoffish and cool inter-human contacts 
which see and treat people only as occupants of certain positions. From this perspective 
little attention is paid to the organisational culture, i.e. to the importance of factors such as 
the atmosphere of the unit or company where one works, interest in one another̀ s personal 
circumstances, team spirit and mutual trust, engagement and positive identification of the 
workers with the company. 
Interesting in this connection is the opinion of Donald Kalf in his book Independence 
for Europe. The End of the American Business Model8. Kalf s̀ thesis is that the hard Ameri-
can model causes ever higher social costs which for a long time have remained rather 
invisible, such as tensions between business branches (e.g. corporations and the financial 
circuit), between different management sections within the company, etc; but first of all, that 
the American model, due to the fact that it parasitizes on all sorts of social resources but at 
the same time erodes them, seriously has undermined the social foundations of cooperation, 
trust and commitment. In other words, that model constitutes an assault on crucial condi-
tions for a good and enduring functioning of corporations. In Kalf’s opinion, and rightly so 
to my mind, the European or “Rhineland” model, more than the rough American model, 
has an eye for these social resources or for the human and personal aspect of the business 
world, and therefore has better prospects, at least in the long run.
Philosophical underpinnings
Philosophically this whole train of thought, emphasizing the importance of social and 
inter-human aspects of human life, is also more in line with the views that in the last cen-
tury have been developed by the so-called dialogical and hermeneutic philosophies and 
then were adopted by other schools of thought. From the perspective of those philosophies 
man is not by nature the solitary, pre-social individual of early-modern social and political 
philosophy who only secondarily enters into social relationships. Seen that way, society 
is entirely a goal-oriented association that has been established by means of a contract. 
So, from this point of view social relations are (nothing but) contractual relations9, and 
society is simply the aggregate of the individuals concerned – the corollary of that is, of 
course, that the common good equals the sum total of the private interests. Over against 
this ontological individualism, which, as indicated, views the mutually independent indi-
viduals as the last real building blocks of society, for which in this way the subject is a 
substance category10 and relations are of a purely external kind, that is, irrelevant to the 
identity of the persons concerned, the above-mentioned philosophies take the view that 
man from his very nature is a community- and communication-oriented being. In other 
words, man as a person realizes himself in and through the relationships he is involved 
8 Original title in Dutch: Kalf 2004.
9 See e.g.  Gauthier 1977. The first sentence of the article reads: “The conception of social relationships as 
contractual lies at the core of our ideology.”
10 Think of  Descartes’ designation of the subject or ego as a “thinking thing” (res cogitans).
158 Koo van der Wal. europe, Idea of a Continent: the Quest for the european Identity
in. So relations in this manner are crucial factors in the shaping of his identity as a human 
person. They affect him to the core of his nature – not all of course, some remaining external 
and superficial, but many do. The person, that is to say, is a relation category rather than 
a substance category. Here also lies the reason that man from his very nature is a social 
and cultural being living in a communal context with its symbolic universe, way of life, 
language and tradition, outside which he cannot live a fully human life.
Conclusions
The above is an attempt to explicate ideal-typically the “story” by which European in-
stitutions and practices orient themselves. – Once more: there can be no vital institution 
without supporting story. In the field of religious studies, e.g., it is common knowledge 
that the rite and the myth are two sides of the same coin, that therefore a rite without its 
accompanying myth has no chance of survival, at any rate not in the longer run. – But 
not only is the above sketch of the basic purport of a series of phenomena that are charac-
teristic of Europe ideal-typical, it is also, at least partially, counterfactual: the European 
social and political reality is determined to a not unimportant extent by non-ideal fac-
tors (power relations, conflicts of interests, differences which have arisen and become 
es ta- b lished in the course of history, etc.), which are not infrequently at odds with the 
ideal story. Being impressed by that stubborn reality is in all likelihood the cause of most 
scepticism regarding Europe.
Nevertheless, however distorted by that stubborn reality, the European story is cons-
tantly working on all levels of European society and offers guidance to the processes at 
work there. Put otherwise: the ideal story continually `shines through’ our acting and 
thinking. We therefore endorse it performatively and at least implicitly all the time. The 
philosophical contribution to that could be to articulate and think through the story as 
broadly as possible and in that way to propound an inspiring and motivating social, 
cultural and political ideal.
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EUROPOS KONTINENTO IDĖJA: 
EUROPIETIŠKOSIOS TAPATYBĖS PAIEŠKOS
Koo van der Wal
Santrauka
Atsitolinama nuo plačiai paplitusio skepticizmo ir laikomasi pagarbios pozicijos 
europietiškosios tapatybės atžvilgiu. Tvirtinama, kad egzistuoja tiek europietiškoji 
kultūra ir mentalitetas kaip tam tikras europietiškasis „pasakojimas“, tiek Europos 
ekonomika, teisė ir politika. Bandoma parodyti, kad šiuolaikinėje Europoje gali 
būti aptinkama gana daug tam tikrų glaudžiai susijusių institucijų, veiklos rūšių, 
įsitikinimų ir vyraujančių idėjų. Tai siekiama išryškinti, europietiškąją kultūrą 
supriešinant su nevakarietiškosiomis bei su Amerikos visuomene ir mentalitetu. 
Straipsnio autoriaus manymu, europietiškasis „pasakojimas“ nūdienėje epochoje 
neretai vis dar iškraipomas sustabarėjusių galios santykių ir interesų konfliktų, 
todėl turi būti iš naujo apmąstomas ir interpretuojamas šiuolaikinio socialinio bei 
filosofinio mąstymo perspektyvoje.
Reikšminiai žodžiai: kultūrinis veiksnys, demokratija, europietiškasis „pasako-
jimas“, ne-demoso argumentas, visuomenės diferenciacija. 
Received 19 Marc 2008, accepted 25 June 2008
